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Nearly nine years after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the European Union (EU) is struggling to recover. What started as a housing crisis in the United States spilled over into Europe 
and grew into full-blown economic struggle for countries inside and 
outside the European Monetary Union (EMU). Now, the European 
Central Bank (ECB), the institution charged with overseeing the EMU, 
is charged with stabilizing the entire banking system throughout the 
Eurozone.1 This is only the most recent effort to address what has become 
the “new normal” in the EMU through the expanded mandate of the 
ECB.
In an age of globalization, the role of the ECB is greatly important 
to all players in the economy. The effects of the 2008 financial crisis 
demonstrate the dangers of contagion, especially for countries pushing 
for greater economic liberalization.2 So, what implications do crises have 
for efforts to encourage economic liberalization, like encouraging central 
bank independence? What will these unsettling times mean for the 
long-term relationship between governments and independent central 
banks?
In this paper, we examine when political leaders will support or 
undermine the legitimacy of independent central banks in the aftermath 
of economic crises. We argue if a government is optimistic about its 
chances of retaining power and securing economic recovery, it will be 
more likely to issue positive, legitimizing statements toward its indepen-
dent central bank. We evaluate this argument using the compelling and 
important case of the ECB following the 2008 GFC.
Our study makes a number of important contributions to both 
academic and policy communities. First, we highlight an important link 
between political and economic policy spheres using the mechanism of 
optimism. Previous studies have demonstrated the impact of optimism 
on individual activity in the economic market, but our study extends this 
research in a new area by using optimism to link political and economic 
activity.3 Next, we seek to further unpack the concept of central bank 
independence by highlighting the small but meaningful ways legitimacy 
1 Danny Hakim, “The Man Who’ll Do Triage on Europe’s Banks,” New York 
Times, 2013.
2 D. Das, “Globalization in the World of Finance,” An International Finance 
Reader, New York (2003): Routledge, pp. 3-11.
3 A. Cukierman, “Monetary policy and institutions before, during, and after 
the global financial crisis,” Journal of Financial Stability (2013): 8.
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can be chipped away from these institutions. We 
are answering the call from scholars to examine 
how financial crises can impact these institu-
tions.4 Finally, we add to the growing literature 
that seeks to further explain the implications 
of the Eurozone crisis and the role of the ECB 
in resolving that crisis. By showing the impor-
tance of political optimism, we contribute to the 
broader discussions of how to manage the crisis 
and how to resolve it.
The Significance of Central Bank Indepen-
dence
Extant literature suggests that central bank in-
dependence (CBI) is a viable strategy for states 
to use to stabilize domestic economies, which 
could help prevent and respond to financial 
crises. Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti test the 
relationship between legal CBI and inflation in 
72 countries over four decades. The authors find 
higher levels of CBI have a negative relationship 
to levels of inflation and a positive relationship 
to price stability.5 Thus, making the central bank 
an agent with a mandate for price stability allows 
the government to follow through with goals es-
tablished in monetary policy. Therefore, if CBI 
were found to strengthen these long-term goals, 
states would be less likely to experience currency 
crises.
Alesina and Summers build on these findings 
by providing further evidence that delegating 
monetary policy to independent central banks 
promotes price stability. The authors argue the 
preferences of independent central banks are 
likely to be even more inflation averse than the 
preferences of society at large. Therefore, the 
independence of central banks from politicians 
with short-term goals helps to ensure long-term 
price stability in domestic economies.6 Both of 
4 W. Berger and F. Kismer. “Central bank inde-
pendence and financial stability: A tale of perfect 
harmony?” European Journal of Political Economy 31 
(2013): 117.
5 A. Cukierman, S. Webb and B. Neyapti, “Measur-
ing the Independence of Central Banks and Its Ef-
fect on Policy Outcomes,” The World Bank Economic 
Review 6 (1992): 353-398.
6 A. Alesina and L. Summers, “Central Bank Inde-
pendence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some 
these studies demonstrate the positive impact of 
CBI on domestic economic performance as well 
as government credibility in the international 
economy.
More recent scholarship has shifted the focus 
toward the interrelationship between CBI and 
political consequences. Bernhard and Leblang 
demonstrate expectations of a currency crisis 
can precipitate the end of a government and 
different types of governments can influence the 
probability of a currency crisis.7 Clearly, then, 
governments are sensitive to financial markets 
and may be willing to take different political 
strategies to ensure political survival in the face 
of impending financial crises.
Pascal Petit demonstrates the strong con-
nection between politics and economic crises 
in the context of the EU after the 2008 GFC. 
He argues, “the euro crisis is in the first place a 
political crisis,” rather than simply an economic 
crisis.8 For Petit, strong political leadership is 
critical to resolving the crisis and allowing the 
ECB to function properly. Again, we see schol-
arship pointing to a strong connection between 
political choices and economic outcomes.
Our study extends previous research by em-
phasizing how CBI can be used specifically as a 
strategy to overcome financial crises. Moreover, 
we extend the current literature to investigate 
to what extent political actors attempt to legiti-
mize or delegitimize the central bank’s efforts to 
respond to financial crises.
The Political Choice of CBI 
We conceptualize the relationship between the 
government and the central bank as a princi-
pal-agent framework. All governments have, 
by law or tradition, individuals or institutions 
designated as the principal policymaker for 
monetary and financial policy. In every case, 
Comparative Evidence,” Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking 25 (1993): 151-159.
7 W. Bernhard and D. Leblang, “Cabinet Collapses 
and Currency Crashes,” Political Research Quarterly 
6, no.3 (2008): 521.
8 P. Petit, “Building faith in a common currency: 
can the Eurozone get beyond the Common Market 
logic?” Cambridge Journal of Economics 36, no.1 
(2012): 273.
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principals have the capability and willingness to 
consider delegating this power to agents, either 
informally or formally, through legal processes. 
In the EMU, the preferred agent is a central 
bank, and the primary choice a principal must 
make in the case of delegation is to what degree 
they will allow this agent to have independence.
Governments will delegate monetary policy 
to independent central banks to increase the 
credibility of a state’s commitments to monetary 
policy and to increase the ease and efficiency of 
the signaling process itself. By tying their hands 
to a specific monetary policy through increasing 
the independence of central banks, policymak-
ers signal to market actors they are serious about 
committing to their policies without the inter-
ference of short-term political goals.9 Once the 
goals of central banks are clearly stated and in-
dependence is established, market actors must 
only look to one focal point for information 
regarding a state’s monetary policy.10
However, during monetary and financial 
crises, this principal-agent relationship comes 
under stress. Financial crises often result in price 
instability, inflation, and general economic insta-
bility—all of which are concerns central banks 
are designed to mitigate. While financial crises 
have severe economic consequences, these condi-
tions are also dangerous for the political climate 
of states, as economic instability is known to 
create public dissatisfaction and unrest.11
In times of crisis, the principal-agent re-
lationship becomes particularly salient for 
governments. One key benefit of making central 
banks independent is the insulation from short-
term political goals that allow central banks to 
focus on long-term economic stability of their 
domestic economies.12 However, long-term goals 
9 W. Bernhard, J. L. Broz and W. Clark, “The Politi-
cal Economy of Monetary Institutions,” Internation-
al Organization 56 (2002): 693-723.
10 D. Leblang and S. Satyanath, “Institutions, Expec-
tations, and Currency Crises,” International Organi-
zation 60 (2006): 245-262.
11 Bernhard and Leblang, Political Research Quarterly, 
518-530.
12 W. Bernhard, J. L. Broz and W. Clark, “The Politi-
cal Economy of Monetary Institutions,” Internation-
al Organization 56 (2002): 693-723.
can often be at odds with short-term demands by 
the public, such as reducing unemployment in 
the short term rather than controlling inflation 
in the long term. Thus, vulnerable governments 
may choose to delegitimize their independent 
central banks to open the possibility for short-
term economic policies.
The central mechanism for determining 
whether governments will alter their relation-
ship with central banks is optimism, which is an 
opinion by a political elite that she will remain in 
power. From an economic perspective, we know 
that optimism is a key stimulus to the economy. 
Consider the following quote from Cukierman:
When agents in the economy are more 
optimistic, they tend to borrow and 
lend more.   This leads to larger levels of 
credit.   At higher levels of credit, both 
borrowers and lenders are more exposed to 
negative news.   Consequently, when new 
negative information arrives, the likelihood 
of a financial crisis is larger when leverage is 
higher.  In addition the recessionary impact 
of the crisis is stronger when leverage is 
larger.13
We believe, therefore, that optimism is equally 
powerful in the political sphere. Just as economic 
agents will regain confidence in optimistic 
economic climates, so too will political agents 
respond positively to optimist outlooks.
Therefore, if governments are optimistic that 
they will retain power, governments will be more 
likely to continue to legitimize the work of in-
dependent central banks in managing monetary 
policy. In these cases, governments feel they 
are less vulnerable to the public and are more 
willing to allow central banks to manage crises 
with a long-term outlook. However, if govern-
ments are less optimistic about their survival, we 
argue that governments will attempt to take back 
control of monetary power and seek to delegiti-
mize independent central banks. Less optimistic 
governments will seek to take back control of 
monetary policy in an effort to show the general 
public it is in control of the economy. Moreover, 
less optimistic governments might believe they 
13 A. Cukierman, “Monetary policy and institutions 
before, during, and after the global financial crisis,” 
Journal of Financial Stability (2013): 8.
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are more politically vulnerable and will look for 
short-term solutions, which are less likely to be 
offered by independent central banks.
H1: High levels of government optimism 
will result in greater support of central bank 
independence.
H2: Low levels of government optimism 
will result in less support of central bank 
independence.
Research Design
The European Union’s response to the 2008 
GFC provides an ideal case in which to evaluate 
our argument. The European Central Bank is 
the institution in the EU that has the greatest 
influence over monetary policy; the ECB acts 
as the supranational coordinating bank for 
the national central banks in Europe using the 
euro.14 The primary objective of the ECB is to 
maintain price stability, although the ECB has 
also been responsible for overseeing the intro-
duction and stability of the Euro since 1999.
Recently, the mandate and role of the ECB 
changed dramatically. While the crisis origi-
nated in the United States of America, it had a 
profound impact in Europe. In particular, the 
GFC caused real estate bubbles to burst in vul-
nerable countries like Spain and Ireland. The 
GFC also forced inevitable collapse in countries 
relying on high taxes and consumer spending 
to uphold their solvency. Altogether, the GFC 
had the strongest impact in Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain, which collectively 
have come to be known as the GIIPS countries. 
The interconnected nature of the Eurozone 
meant financial crisis in five countries now 
impacted eighteen countries directly, through 
monetary and financial policy. Additionally, 
the interconnectedness of the Eurozone meant 
the responsibility to address and resolve the 
crisis must come from one unified source. 
Consequently, the ECB has been forced to 
step into a crisis management role that it was 
otherwise unprepared to assume.
14 J. Wrase, “The Euro and the European Central 
Bank,” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business 
Review (1999): 3-4.
To examine our hypotheses, we focus on 
three key states within the EMU—Germany, 
France, and Greece. We focus on Germany 
as a country that has been at the epicenter of 
managing the Eurozone crisis. The ECB is 
modeled after, and is adjacent to, the German 
Bundesbank in Frankfurt. Consequently, 
German politics play a much larger role in 
policies and functions of the ECB than other 
states in the EMU.15 Additionally, German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel stands apart as one 
of the most politically secure leaders throughout 
the EMU. Even though Merkel faced re-elec-
tion within the time frame of our analysis, few 
scholars or policymakers ever considered her 
vulnerable, which cannot be said of many politi-
cians in the rest of Europe.16
We also focus our study on France, as it is 
the second most influential state in the EMU.17 
Moreover, considering our theoretical approach, 
the French case offers us the example of a polit-
ically vulnerable leader, Nicholas Sarkozy, who 
lost re-election to François Hollande. Thus, the 
French case provides an opportunity to examine 
behaviors of a politically vulnerable leader and a 
newly elected leader in the same country.
Finally, we focus on Greece as a juxtapo-
sition to Germany and France. Greece was 
one of the hardest hit countries in the GFC, 
and its recovery has been the most difficult. 
Consequently, Greece has had five different 
leaders between 2008 and 2014, only one of 
which enjoyed any kind of political stability. 
Thus, we see all three cases as excellent examples 
of our theoretical approach.
We implement a qualitative case-study 
analysis focusing on news sources for data. To 
gather our sources, we ran a LexisNexis Academic 
search to gather a sample of news sources from 
1 January 2008 through 22 October 2014. We 
searched within English language, major world 
publications to capture the largest sample of 
15 J. Bibow, “At The Crossroads: The Euro and Its 
Central Bank Guardian (and Savior?),” Levy Institute 
of Bard College, no. 738 (2012): 1-24.
16 “One woman to rule them all,” The Economist, 
September 14, 2013.
17 A. Evans-Pritchard, “IMF: global economy faces a 
threatening downward spiral,” The Telegraph, 2011.
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credible news agencies and to control for any 
potential bias between publications of various 
geographic origin or political leaning.
To construct our sample, we searched for 
key terms related to primary concepts in our 
study, and we narrowed the sample to focus on 
the most relevant documents. First, we discarded 
documents that were not directly relevant 
to the Eurozone crisis or the ECB. Then, we 
eliminated documents without specific refer-
ences to political leaders by name. Ultimately, 
these efforts left us with a sample of 16 total 
documents—six for Germany, four for France, 
and six for Greece.
Using this sample, we conducted a content 
analysis of our key independent variable and our 
key dependent variable to determine the rela-
tionship between the level of optimism expressed 
and its impact on the legitimacy of the ECB. To 
find indicators of the level of political optimism, 
our independent variable, we looked for positive 
or negative statements from political leaders 
about the economic or political status of their 
country or the EMU. In some cases, we substi-
tuted third-party commentary on the leaders’ 
tone when direct quotes were not available; 
negative tone suggested low levels of political 
optimism whereas positive tone suggested high 
levels of political optimism.
For central bank legitimacy, our dependent 
variable, we looked for statements that empha-
sized de jure or de facto independence of the 
ECB. First, we focused on institutional inde-
pendence, which is a form of legal independence 
that measures prohibition of external influence 
on central banks in the form of taking or seeking 
instruction from external institutions or from 
government officials. Second, we focused on 
personnel independence, which refers to the rate 
of turnover of central bank governors. Finally, we 
focused on financial independence, which refers 
to budgetary independence of central banks. 
Any or all of these three measures were used to 
assess the conditions under which leaders were 
seeking to legitimize or delegitimize these activ-
ities by the ECB.
The Legitimacy of the ECB
In all cases, we see evidence that politically 
optimistic leaders will be more likely to offer 
statements legitimizing the work of the ECB 
and that less-optimistic leaders will be less likely 
to offer statements of support.
In the case of Germany, two articles show 
optimism is directly tied to statements that 
legitimize the actions of the ECB. In the first 
article, Merkel expresses the positive benefits of 
Germany’s adoption of the euro while calling 
for more policy control, or institutional inde-
pendence, for the ECB.18 In the second, Merkel, 
whose “popularity at home is undimmed,” calls 
for the ECB to have more policy control over 
the bailouts in Cyprus, which also corresponds 
to institutional independence.19 In both of these 
examples, we see Chancellor Merkel’s optimism 
corresponds to her calls for increased institution-
al independence for the ECB, which supports 
our first hypothesis.
The second set of examples support our 
second hypothesis that less optimism will be 
accompanied by statements that seek to dele-
gitimize the work of the politically independent 
ECB. The first article notes that Merkel’s “pop-
ularity has sunk to its lowest level in nearly five 
years” and that she is vehemently opposed to 
the sale of Eurobonds, which would provide 
increased financial independence for the 
ECB.20 In the second example, Merkel is facing 
potential “backlash from German voters” which 
has made her “reluctant” to support a common 
banking supervision system under the ECB.21 
Here, her lack of optimism about her political 
future in 2011 made her reluctant to support 
a measure that would increase the institutional 
independence of the ECB. In these two cases we 
seek a lack of political optimism tied to state-
ments that seek to delegitimize the independent 
18 S. O’Grady and V. Mock, “Banks forced to share 
pain of bailout for Greece; Relief across Europe as 
deal on Greek debt is finally agreed,” The Indepen-
dent, 2011.
19 D. Charter, “Angela Merkel banks on keeping 
voters happy,” The Times, 2013.
20 N. Barkin and G. Heller, “Germany’s Eurobond 
debate heats up; Pressure grows; ‘Downward spiral’ 
threat to economies,” The Gazette, Montreal, 2011.
21 K. Maley, “Merkel bank stand spooks investors,” 
Australian Financial Review, 2012.
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functioning of the ECB.
We see similar results in two articles from 
2014. In both cases, Merkel is less optimis-
tic about her political future given the rise 
of the anti-euro party called Alternative for 
Deutschland, which “has drained votes from 
the Christian Democratic Union party of Ms. 
Merkel.”22 In the first article, we see Merkel crit-
icizing the recent bond purchases by the ECB 
while simultaneously feeling political pressure 
from the recent rise of the anti-euro party in 
Germany.23 Then, in the second article, Merkel 
is seen as “stumbling” from the rise of the 
Alternative for Deutschland party while simulta-
neously showing opposition to stimulus measures 
the ECB is hoping to deploy. Holger Schieding, 
chief economist in London for Berenberg bank 
is quoted as saying: “’German resistance against 
the ECB pursuing more aggressive policy is one 
of the things spooking markets.’”24 In both cases, 
Merkel is clearly indicating a lack of support for 
the work of the ECB as she faces increasing op-
position at home, which supports our second 
hypothesis. Altogether, these examples from 
Merkel provide direct support for our argument 
about the impact of the degree of optimism on 
the legitimization of the ECB.
In the case of France, we examine two 
different leaders. First, we look at President 
Nicholas Sarkozy who served as President of 
France from May 2007 until May 2012. Next, 
we look at President François Hollande, who has 
served as President of France since May 2012. In 
examining the attitudes of both leaders, we find 
support for our argument.
For Sarkozy, we found two articles address-
ing the ECB. In the first, from 22 July 2011, 
we see a positive link between optimism and 
support for the ECB, which supports our first 
hypothesis. Sarkozy “heralded” giving more 
financial powers to the ECB so as to quicken 
22 J. Yardley and J. Ewing, “Large Nations in Europe 
Balk at German Gospel of Austerity,” The New York 
Times, 17 October 2014.
23 “ECB policies criticized by Merkel,” The Irish 
Independent, 22 May 2014.
24 J. Yardley and J. Ewing, “Large Nations in Europe 
Balk at German Gospel of Austerity,” The New York 
Times, 17 October 2014.
“the pace of what he called ‘European economic 
governance’.”25 Here, Sarkozy’s optimism is 
linked to his push for more policy power for the 
ECB, which is a positive reflection on the ECB’s 
institutional independence.
In the second article, dated 22 October 
2011, we find support for our second hypoth-
esis. Here, Sarkozy is described as demanding 
French leadership in the ECB and is noted as 
being on the verge of “fury” and “anger.”26 
This article suggests that Sarkozy is waning in 
optimism and thus unwilling to allow the ECB 
to select its own leaders, which sends a clear 
signal that the ECB is not a legitimate actor in 
the eyes of the French government. Therefore, 
in the two examples from President Sarkozy, we 
see evidence supporting both of our hypotheses.
In the second French case, that of President 
François Hollande, we find two articles connect-
ing him to the ECB. In the first article, we find 
support for our first hypothesis. Here, Hollande, 
who was just recently elected and thus not elec-
torally vulnerable, is pushing for a closer banking 
union and additional banking supervision of the 
Eurozone countries under the ECB.27 This push 
for institutional independence confirms our 
argument that politically optimistic leaders will 
seek to boost the legitimacy of the independent 
central bank.
In the second article, from 2014, we see 
a much different perspective from Hollande. 
Here, Hollande’s approval rating has fallen to 
17%, and “the odds would currently seem to 
be against the sitting president.”28 In this case, 
we see Hollande remaining “one of the key 
advocates of a looser approach to the austerity 
and fiscal orthodoxy guarded and promoted 
by Merkel and the ECB.”29 Thus, this article 
25 S. O’Grady and V. Mock, The Independent.
26 N. Squires, “Berlusconi in Sarkozy bank snub,” 
The Daily Telegraph, 2011.
27 L. Armitstead and B. Waterfield, “EU Summit: 
Angela Merkel moves to block Hollande bank union 
deadline,” The Telegraph, 2012. 
28 M. Kettle, “Hollande may yet play role in Europe: 
Even though he lacks popularity at home, the 
French PM is in the right place to challenge Angela 
Merkel and German orthodoxy,” The Guardian 
Weekly (5 September 2014).
29 M. Kettle, The Guardian Weekly, 5 September 
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suggests that as Hollande’s approval continues to 
drop, he will continue to distance himself from 
the policies of the ECB and issue statements that 
delegitimize the role of the ECB in monetary 
and financial affairs. Again, we see evidence of 
our argument that political elites who feel less 
optimistic about their chances of reelection will 
seek to delegitimize the ECB.
In the case of Greece, we find articles for 
three of the five prime ministers who served 
from 2008-2014. First, we have three cases from 
George Papandreou who was an unpopular leader 
from October 2009-November 2011. Next, we 
find two cases from Lucas Papademos who was 
an appointed prime minister from November 
2011-May 2012. Finally, we have two examples 
from Antonis Samaras who was prime minister 
from June 2012-January 2015. In all examples, 
we find support for our argument.
In the examples from Papandreou, we 
find evidence of a leader who is not optimistic 
about his time in office and therefore favors 
pulling back independence from the ECB.30 
Specifically, Papandreou advocated for a public 
vote on bailout packages, which shows his lack 
of concern for the political independence of the 
ECB.31 These examples confirm our hypothesis 
that political leaders who lack optimism will 
seek to take back power from the ECB.
Next, in the examples from Papademos, we 
find a political leader who is unconcerned with 
his tenure in office and is thus supportive of the 
ECB.32 Papademos was appointed as an interim 
prime minister and thus had no reason to concern 
himself with political vulnerability. He regularly 
advocated for full implementation of the policies 
of the ECB, including spending cuts, repaying 
public debt, and eventually allowing the default 
2014.
30 B. Milner, “Europe’s governments prepare to take 
their medicine,” The Globe and Mail (Canada), 7 
November 2011.
31 H. Smith, “Lucas Papademos to lead Greece’s 
interim coalition government,” The Guardian (Lon-
don, England), 10 November 2011.
32 J. Ewing, “Papademos is known for acumen, not 
for flash; New leader is considered a political out-
sider, but that could be an asset,” The International 
Herald Tribune (New York), 11 November 2011.
to take effect.33 These examples provide unique 
insight into our argument to a leader who is not 
concerned with political vulnerability and will 
continue to legitimize the institutional indepen-
dence of the ECB.
Finally, we examine the tenure of Antonis 
Samaras, who was the first prime minister to win 
a general election since 2011. We see evidence 
he is very negative about the future of the 
Greek economy as debt was still over 150% of 
gross domestic product (GDP). Consequently, 
Samaras was arguing the northern EU countries 
should be held responsible for the crisis and 
Greece deserved a two-year extension on 
austerity measures.34,35 Again, we see evidence of 
a politically vulnerable leader who is pessimistic 
about the national economy call for measures 
decreasing the legitimacy of the ECB.
Overall, these examples provide strong 
support for our argument linking optimism and 
central bank legitimacy in the areas of institu-
tional, personnel, and financial independence. 
This is an important step in demonstrating how 
optimism can link political and economic policy 
spheres and the small, but meaningful, ways 
legitimacy can be granted to or chipped away 
from the ECB, particularly in the areas of policy, 
personnel, and finance.
Conclusion
For central banking systems, like the EMU, to 
work effectively, all members must cooperate. 
However, the GIIPS countries effectively broke 
their financial and monetary agreements with 
the rest of the EMU.36 Now, political elites 
throughout the Eurozone and within the ECB 
must make the difficult decision to cooperate on 
33 C. Haritos, “World: I fear for a social explosion: 
Greeks can’t take any more punishment: Helena 
Smith, who has reported from Athens for more 
than 20 years, says the country is falling apart at the 
seams as it desperately tries to solve its debt crisis,” 
The Observer (England), 12 February 2012.
34 J. Hurley, “’Worst is over’ claims Greece as IMF 
backs country reforms,” The Sunday Telegraph (Lon-
don, England), 5 May 2013. 
35 “Eurozone crisis: Greek PM asks for more time to 
implement cuts,” The Scotsman (Edinburg, Scot-
land), 22 August 2012.
36 A. Moravcsik, New York Times.
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behalf of and with these countries to preserve 
the broader economic structure.
In this paper, we sought to determine condi-
tions under which political leaders will support 
or undermine the legitimacy of independent 
central banks in the aftermath of economic 
crises. Our findings revealed more optimis-
tic leaders have demonstrated a willingness to 
support efforts that give more responsibility to 
the ECB to manage and resolve the economic 
crisis. Thus, optimism is directly connected to 
the legitimacy of the ECB.
Unfortunately for Europe, the current 
economic climate remains tenuous as growth 
remains slow throughout the Eurozone, and 
political leaders throughout the EMU are in-
creasingly less optimistic about the direction of 
the European economy. Calls for new directions 
in monetary and financial policy continue to 
come from key leaders, including Merkel37 and 
Hollande,38 as do threats to curb the ECB’s role. 
These attitudes signal that recovery from the 
Eurozone crisis may be farther away than hoped 
for, which demonstrates the continued need for 
optimism among political leadership to spur 
economic recovery.
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